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Background
Payments for Environmental Service (PES) schemes have
become a popular policy instrument for promoting
sustainable natural resource management and conservation.
It is now increasingly recognised that PES can also contribute
to broader economic development objectives such as
sustained rural development, food security and lasting
poverty alleviation (Antle 2008). Accordingly, it has attracted
attention in both developed and developing countries alike,
and has been applied within a wide variety of upland
ecosystems and landscapes for a range of purposes, including
regulation and quality of water for urban supplies,
biodiversity conservation and climate change mitigation. This
introductory article emphasises why PES schemes are of
particular relevance for mountain regions, discusses the
underlying concept and summarises key factors and
challenges for design and implementation.
What is PES? 
Payments for environmental services (PES)  are mechanisms
under which those who provide environment-related positive
‘externalities’2 are compensated voluntarily for doing so,
usually through payments from beneficiaries – those who
consume the service provided – or intermediaries such as the
government (see Figure 1). 
The basic principle behind PES is that environmental
stewards, or land-users, receive few (financial) benefits for
sustainable resource management and conservation, which
provide numerous direct and indirect services, e.g. water
services (including flow and quality of water, erosion and
sedimentation control, water table control and salinisation,
and water habitat conservation), conservation of
biodiversity, carbon sequestration, and landscape amenities
(see 2.1 to 2.5) to the wider community.  These benefits are
often less than those received from more destructive and less
sustainable management practices, such as conversion of
forests for annual crops or pasture. Payments by
beneficiaries and other incentives can help make the
sustainable management option more attractive, and thus
sustain conservation-friendly land usage or induce necessary
changes. 
Why focus on mountains?
Mountain communities (some 720 million people – or 12% of
the world’s population) are stewards of essential
environmental services and have for centuries played a
critical role in maintaining a sustainable flow of resources to
the plains below. For example, mountains are ‘water
towers’, supplying freshwater to more than half of humanity;
are characterised by high levels of endemism and species
variety, and mountain tourism accounts for 15-20% of the
world’s tourism industry (Price 2004). Whilst mountain
ecosystems are highly susceptible to environmental
degradation from unsustainable land use practices, the
primary land users are often poor and are heavily dependent
on agricultural land use. Under these conditions, well-
targeted and well-designed incentive schemes for sustainable
land and resource management have the potential to achieve
conservation and development objectives. 
Meeting the criteria
a) a voluntary transaction, where b) a well-defined
environmental service(s) is bought by c) a minimum of one
buyer from a minimum of one seller, d) if and only if the
seller secures the provision of the service.
Box 1: Defining PES   Source: Wunder 2005
The literature tends to interpret PES according to a definition
developed by Wunder (see Box 1). The World Agroforestry
Centre (ICRAF) has identified four broad criteria for assessing
and implementing PES schemes, which builds on this analysis:
they should be realistic, voluntary, conditional, and,
critically, pro-poor (see Leimona et. al, pg 10 for a more in
depth analysis of these terms and their applications). In
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1 This is a summary of the full article produced especially for the Bulletin. See  www.mtnforum.org/rs/ol/browse.cfm?tp=vdanddocid=5423
2 Externality (or spillover) of an economic transaction refers to the effects arising from the economic activities of one party that impact directly on another’s utility or production
function, but for which no appropriate compensation is paid (see Buchanan and Stubblebine, "Externality", Economica 1962). A positive externality is an unintended, unpaid for
benefit from production/consumption (typically leading to under-production); a negative externality is unintended harm, when part of the cost is born by someone other than the
producer/consumer (typically leading to over-production). 
Women selling agroforestry products in the buffer zone of Bac Kan National Park,
Vietnam. Photo: Beria Leimona.
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Figure 1: PES and ES   Source: Pagiola, S., and G. Platais 2007.
the water bill in Zapalinamé, Mexico which has so far raised
US $28,000 for watershed conservation (Blackaller, pg. 79),
and the early example of the privately financed PES in Vittel,
France, which bought off farmers’ debts and provided other
incentives in return for reducing nitrate contamination from
agricultural runoff (Perrot-Maître, pg. 58). 
Payments for biodiversity conservation
Several local and national conservation programmes focus on
conservation of high value ecosystems such as wetlands and
rare or endangered species such as snow leopards, tigers,
and mountain gorillas. Some examples of reward mechanisms
include a) eco-certification schemes, encouraging ethical
conservation practices for a price premium as in the case of
the Rhön marketing initiative (Robinson, pg. 60) and for
shade-grown coffee in the Sierra Madre, Mexico (Zepeda, pg.
80); b) subsidies from governmental organisations for
delivery of conservation-friendly land use practices, e.g. EU
agri-environmental payments (Hovorka, pg.66); c) mitigation
schemes to ensure compensation in the case of e.g. property
development (Gartner, pg. 87), and d) in-kind incentives
given to local communities to ensure protection of rare and
endangered species and habitats (Wangchuk, pg. 25).
Payments for landscape beauty
Typically, tourism operators have been reluctant to share
profits with land stewards for the services they provide to
tourists, either through landscape management,
conservation or avoided environmental degradation. Many
protected areas have also not exploited the willingness of
tourists to pay for ecosystem conservation. However, recent
studies are showing that there is willingness to pay for
aesthetic beauty even in relatively poor areas in developing
countries, as shown in the valuations of the Margalla Hills
National Park, Pakistan (Khan, pg. 47) and the Scho’llet
Forest, Peru (Alva, pg. 83). Meanwhile tour operators are
paying higher prices for conditional environmental services
provided by local communities (Gyeltshen, pg. 34). Definite
contracts with detailed and precise mutual obligations are
still a relatively distant outcome in implementation of ES
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practice, PES schemes range from purely market based to
more regulated approaches, and reference is increasingly
made to “PES-like” initiatives that meet some but not all of
the criteria. This Bulletin includes such cases of “unpure PES”
on the basis that they provide necessary learnings about how
these four conditions might be applied and integrated in
mountain areas in future, particularly given the relatively
recent implementation of most PES initiatives (see interview
with Meine van Noordwijk, pg. 23). 
“Payments” is taken to refer to any incentive (monetary or
non-monetary) that encourages people to behave in a certain
manner.  This may take the form of support with developing
infrastructure; insurance against, for example, crop
depredation by wildlife; training and capacity development;
securing land use rights, or more generally enhancing social
organisation.
Environmental valuation and PES 
A key constraint to implementing conservation strategies is
that, while the benefits of non-market goods and services
are increasingly recognised with regard to their monetary
values, these values are often not fully accounted for by
individuals and society in decision making processes. Only
when these values are included in economic efficiency
calculations, e.g. cost-benefit-analyses, can they be fully
internalised by consumers and policy makers.  Different
approaches have been developed over the past decades that
attempt to express consumer demand, i.e. their willingness
to pay for a certain good or their willingness to accept
monetary compensation for the loss of the same. The
challenge remains in how to translate these economic values
into real resource flows (see Negi, pg. 44 and Khan, pg. 47 for
further discussions on this topic).  
Types of  environmental services
Natural resources are the source of important ecological,
economic and social functions, which provide a wide range of
direct and indirect goods and services for human
consumption and as inputs into production processes.
Environmental Services (ES) can be provided through
watershed management, biodiversity conservation,
landscape beauty related to tourism, carbon sequestration,
and sustainable agriculture, each of which are outlined
briefly below in relation to development of markets. The
term “environmental services” is used rather than
‘ecosystem services’ in order to apply the concept to a wide
range of application domains, also outside of a particular
ecosystem.
Payments for watershed services 
Watershed services include the regulation of water flow by
storing water in wetlands and lakes, slow release of rain or
melt water, prevention of flooding, reduced soil erosion and
reduced contamination from nitrates and soil erosion in order
to ensure good quality water. Upstream-downstream
payments for water services represent the basis for a PES
model that people are trying to replicate in developed and
developing countries, often bringing together water users
including public/private suppliers of water and hydropower
and government agencies. The advantage of PES in this
context is that upstream/downstream linkages are apparent
as a result of the natural landscape and are often readily
acknowledged by downstream users. A substantial number of
cases in the bulletin relate to water services. Some more
unusual schemes include the wholly voluntary supplement to
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Intensive agriculture affecting ES on farmland, Tunisia. Photo: Frank van Schoubroeck.
7[ Mountain Forum Bulletin January 2010 ]
Overview
projects for landscape beauty, and as yet many cases
manifest themselves simply as reformed entrance fees. 
Payments for carbon sequestration
Most recently and probably with the strongest potential to
leverage large scale resource flows, there has been a
significant emergence of PES schemes in the context of
climate change mitigation.  The two platforms in use are a)
the regulated market under the Kyoto Protocol, wherein
developed countries trade emissions credits up to an overall
“cap”, and b) the voluntary markets, which bring together
private sector firms, international NGOs and individual
consumers in the North. Under the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) established through the Kyoto Protocol,
industrialised countries with a greenhouse gas reduction
commitment (Annex 1 countries) can mitigate their own
emissions through investments in projects that reduce
emissions in developing countries, including de-/af-
forestation. A case study of the first registered CDM project
in China (Chen, pg. 40) assesses the sustainability of this kind
of project under current regulations. 
Recent discussions have focused extensively on the potential
of “reducing emissions through deforestation and forest
degradation” (REDD) or, simply put, avoided deforestation.
This is designed to reward conservation in areas of high
biodiversity and implies paying countries for not cutting
down trees. Financial turnover in these kinds of PES schemes
is substantial. According to IIED, the global carbon market
will be worth US $118 billion/year by the end of 2009, and to
date some US $800 million has already been invested in REDD
(IIED 2009).   
Payments for agricultural services
Whilst farmers are often responsible for delivering the
aforementioned ES, e.g. clean water, there are also some
PES schemes that specifically target the way farmers use
their own farmland and production to provide ES, such as
conservation of agro-biodiversity through pollination services
(Partap, pg. 42); high nature value, low-intensity farming
practices (shade-grown agricultural produce in Tunisia,
Schoubroeck, pg. 17; agro-forestry in the Sierra Madre,
Mexico pg. 80), and conservation of traditional agricultural
landscapes (Robinson, pg. 60).  
Learnings and recommendations
Based on the experiences of the expert networks, various
reports and the cases collected in this special issue of the
Mountain Forum Bulletin, the following key points are
identified as being critical for designing and implementing
PES programmes:
Raising awareness 
Limitations in understanding and implementing PES as a
rigorous and systematic methodology has led to slow uptake
of PES in both the private and public sectors, although this is
changing. This Bulletin provides several examples of
education programmes around ES inducing willingness to pay
amongst local stakeholders, especially for water (e.g.
Blackaller, pg. 79)
1) Awareness of national policy makers, potential buyers
and users, and other stakeholders can be raised through
workshops, media campaigns and action research and
demonstrations.  
2) Experiences with PES implementation have been
generated at a variety of levels over the last few years.
It is therefore recommended that systematic learning,
knowledge sharing and networking across PES schemes
as in “Communities of Practice” are established to inform
design and enable replication, nationally, across regions
and internationally.
Using scientific evidence and valuing ES 
In any given area, the flow of services has rarely been
characterised in biophysical and economic terms, making it
difficult to establish baselines, target providers, develop
indicators and assure conditionality of the payments on the
provision of the required service. 
1) Marketable services must be clearly defined and valued,
and 2) baseline studies are required to determine and
quantify environmental threats at the start of the
project so that the impact of the ES scheme can be
assessed, e.g. the level of water pollution or
sedimentation in rivers. 
3) Monitoring of effective implementation and compliance
is necessary, and should be built into the design stages.
It is also recommended to integrate indicators for
monitoring the effects of the scheme on poverty and
gender. This Bulletin refers to the RUPES Sumberjaya
experience, where community members were rewarded
based on actual sediment reductions, measured using
simple, low cost techniques (Huang and Upadhyaya 2007;
interview, pg 23).  
Ensuring meaningful participation
Land users must be meaningfully engaged in order to
understand what incentives will work, and how (see Didier
Orange’s proposal and conclusions for the development of a
biodigester scheme in Vietnam, pg. 52).  In poorer
communities it may make sense to incorporate training and
awareness building into the programmes to ensure longer-
term sustainability, which is a highlighted learning from many
of the community-led initiatives for biodiversity and
watershed conservation described in the Bulletin (e.g.
Pradhan, pg. 32).
Avoiding “perverse incentives” and leakages
It is clear that PES has to be fair to be effective, particularly
in a developing country context:  a scheme cannot succeed
by rewarding only the polluters and not those already
engaging in pollution-control behaviour (interview, pg. 23).
‘Leakages’ may also occur in areas outside of the focus of
intervention. Examples are poachers who move out of a
protected area but continue their practices in a non-
protected area. Addressing such issues needs to be built into
monitoring and project design, and more research needs to
be undertaken to assess impacts on people/landscapes not
specifically targeted by the PES scheme. This may include
indirect consequences such as higher food prices. 
Assuring profitability and efficiency
Transaction costs relate to outgoing expenditure associated
with managing the services, including payments, and
monitoring and delivery.  Dealing with a large number of
scattered individuals is more complex and has higher costs
than dealing with a few large service providers or
representative organisations. The ‘opportunity cost’ of the
‘conventional’ land use system is the foregone income from
activities that could have taken place instead of engaging in
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the new activity. Particularly for smallholder farmers,
investment and opportunity costs can be too high to make
participation worthwhile, and the benefits are often only felt
over a long time frame (Huang and Upadhyaya 2007; Rasul
2009; Schoubroeck, pg 17). For example, one study found
that transaction costs for a land tenure rights group in
Sumberjaya, Indonesia would be approximately US $55 per
household, when the average annual farm household income
is under US $109 (Huang and Upadhyaya 2007; Arifin 2005). 
1) Benefits for the service providers must be adequate to
sustain the proposed practices, and combining the
monetary benefits of various PES and other productive
income generating activities, e.g. agroforestry, may be
relevant (see interview, pg. 23; Zepeda, pg. 80). 
2) Rather than incentivising individual services or aspects
of the landscape, an approach is now emerging that
recommends co-ordinating reward mechanisms to
provide a meaningful and complementary set of
incentives for locally and globally important
environmentally services (Zepeda, pg 80; Huberman, pg
14), which may address high opportunity and transaction
costs for local farmers. Typically, this “landscape” or
“ecoregion” approach combines water and carbon, but
has significant potential for assimilating tourism and
other agriculture related services. This may involve
integrating eco-certification schemes, for example, as
an incentive to boost productivity and profits in
landscapes that are conserved for carbon and/or water
services. 
3) Research suggests that in-kind rewards can be an
effective mechanism especially when combined with
payments, as farmers gain the potential for
supplementary income through receipt of trainings and
other technical assistance (Huang and Upadhyaya 2007).
There are also cases where land tenure or secure usage
rights have been granted as an incentive: in the Vittel
case in France (Perrot-Maître, pg. 58), and in
Sumberjaya, Indonesia, where coffee farmers were given
conditional tenurial rights as part of their benefits
through the RUPES programme (interview, pg 23). 
4) In poorer areas, finance can be provided to cover initial
start-up costs and investments through e.g. pro-poor
microfinance initiatives (Kollmair, pg. 12 and Orange, pg
52). It may be advisable to follow the example of the
Costa Rican PES design and stagger payments, providing
the bulk of funds in the early years. 
5) It is likely to be more cost-effective to transfer payments
through community funds rather than making time
consuming individual transfers to households,
particularly in densely populated areas. In Costa Rica,
small farmers join the programme through a system of
collective bargaining to disperse transaction costs
(Pagiola et al. 2004; RECOFTC 2009). 
Role of intermediary organisations 
Intermediaries can help in building trust between buyers and
suppliers, reducing transaction costs and providing seed
funding, and are also key in designing and facilitating pro-
poor markets (see the LI-BIRD case in Nepal, Pradhan, pg.
32). In many instances, it is clear that PES schemes would
not have been developed without their presence. However,
there is often limited stakeholder outreach and dialogue,
assessment of impact in the design and monitoring stages,
and weak financial management (Chen, pg. 40); as such,
there is a need to enhance capacity in this regard. 
Securing land rights
The lack of clearly defined or secure tenurial rights is a
significant impediment to both equitable distribution of
benefits and ecological conservation. Similarly if stewards do
not feel secure, either because of illegal resource usage or
because of interference from regulatory or government
bodies, they may not be willing to invest in long-term
resource management techniques (see Wendland, pg. 19 and
Schoubroeck, pg. 17). The process of formalising rights,
meanwhile, is a complex process - particularly if the
stewarded environmental services have suddenly become a
valuable commodity. In these instances, it may be cheaper
(more “efficient”) to clear people from the land and seize
the resources (see interview, pg. 23). 
1) Land ownership must be clear, and national and local
authorities should formalise customary land claims where
necessary. Temporary tenure arrangements may be a
possibility.
2) To avoid incursions onto land, institutional strengthening
should be a key aspect of the planning and budgeting
stages. For more on this, see Wendland’s article on land
tenure issues in Ecuador and Indonesia (pg. 19).
Sustainability of funding 
Funding for PES schemes often comes from parties not
directly benefitting e.g. governments, donors, or NGOs.
Many instances have shown that sustainability is a concern
when core services are being paid from external sources and
not by the service users themselves. To assure sustainability
it is therefore recommended to see that:
1) Core costs of the system are covered from national /
local sources. 
2) The use of external funding is exclusively used for
capacity development, research and providing
infrastructure, transparency and start-up activities. 
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Traditional organic farming landscape in Austria. Photo: Gerhard Hovorka.
IIED (March 2009), Briefing: Financing REDD: Meshing Markets
with Government Funds 
Lee, E. and Mahanty, S., (2009) “Payments for Environmental
Services and Poverty Reduction: Risks and Opportunities,”
RECOFTC Issues Paper
Pagiola, S. et. al. 2004. Paying for Biodiversity Conservation
in Agricultural Landscapes. The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Pagiola, S; Platais. G (2007) Payments for Environmental
Services: From Theory to Practice. Washington: World Bank.
Price, M. (2004), Conservation and Sustainable Development
in Mountain Areas, IUCN
Rasul, G (2009) Ecosystem services and agricultural land-use
practices: a case study of the Chittagong Hill Tracts of
Bangladesh, ICIMOD
Wunder, S(2005) Payments for Environmental Services: Some
Nuts and Bolts. CIFOR OccasionalPaper 2. Bogor, Indonesia:
Centre for International Forestry Research.
Xiaoyun, L; Leshan, J;  Ting, Z  (2006) Payment for watershed
services in China: Role of government and market, a
diagnostic study, College of humanities and development,
China Agricultural University
Frans Neuman (f.neuman@mtnforum.org) is Executive
Secretary, Ujol Sherchan (usherchan@mtnforum.org) is
Senior Programme Officer and Laura Keenan
(l.Keenan@mtnforum.org) is Programme Officer at the
Mountain Forum Secretariat, Kathmandu, Nepal. David
Huberman (david.huberman@iucn.org) is a Junior
Professional Associate at the Economics and Environmental
Department, IUCN, Switzerland. Klas Sander
(ksander@worldbank.org) is a Natural Resource Economist at
the Environment Department, World Bank, USA. Bhaskar
Karky (bkarky@icimod.org) is a Research Fellow at ICIMOD,
Nepal. Laxman Joshi (L.Joshi@cgiar.org) is a Natural Resource
Management Expert at ICRAF-SEA, Indonesia.
9[ Mountain Forum Bulletin January 2010 ]
Overview
Conclusions
The cases collected in this Bulletin from the five regions
show that PES have the potential to align economic
development with ecological resiliency in mountain areas,
building capacity from the ground up. This is particularly
relevant for community-based approaches to environmental
management, where local communities have been given the
rights and responsibilities to manage resources for supporting
their livelihoods.  
To some extent, however, this means disengaging from the
purely economic definition of PES that has emerged. Very
few cases, if any, exist that are ‘pure’ financial transactions
between ES buyers and sellers, particularly in a developing
country context. Such an approach may also not be
acceptable to providers and/or beneficiaries. In order to
ensure conditionality and meaningful participation from
upland service providers, evidence from the regions suggests
that there is a need and an emerging opportunity to develop
a co-investment paradigm which recognises shared
responsibility, trust, respect and shared benefits along with
financial arrangements. The effective functioning of PES will
require reinterpretation of its “conditions”, better regulation
and enhanced awareness and consideration of local needs,
thereby ensuring that access to the markets promotes and
does not hinder sustainable rural development in mountain
regions.
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